Abstract-In Cyber-Physical Networked Systems (CPNS), the adversary can inject false measurements into the controller through compromised sensor nodes, which not only threaten the security of the system, but also consume network resources. To deal with this issue, a number of en-route filtering schemes have been designed for wireless sensor networks. However, these schemes either lack resilience to the number of compromised nodes or depend on the statically configured routes and node localization, which are not suitable for CPNS. In this paper, we propose a Polynomial-based Compromise-Resilient En-route Filtering scheme (PCREF), which can filter false injected data effectively and achieve a high resilience to the number of compromised nodes without relying on static routes and node localization. PCREF adopts polynomials instead of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) for endorsing measurement reports to achieve resilience to attacks. Each node stores two types of polynomials: authentication polynomial and check polynomial, derived from the primitive polynomial, and used for endorsing and verifying the measurement reports. Through extensive theoretical analysis and experiments, our data shows that PCREF achieves better filtering capacity and resilience to the large number of compromised nodes in comparison to the existing schemes.
INTRODUCTION
M ONITORING and controlling physical systems through distributed sensors and actuators have become important tasks in numerous applications. These applications have received renewed attention because of the advances in sensor network technologies and new developments in cyber-physical networked systems (CPNS) [1] , [2] . CPNS, consisting of sensor nodes, actuators, controller, and wireless networks, have been widely used to monitor and affect local and remote physical entities in the physical world [3] , [4] . Typical CPNS cover a wide range of applications [5] , including transportation networks, vehicular networks, networks of unmanned vehicles, etc.
In CPNS, sensor nodes obtain the measurement from the physical components, process the measurements and send measured data to the controller through networks. According to measurements, the controller estimates the state of physical systems and sends feedback commands to actuators to control the operation of physical systems [6] . CPNS may operate in the hostile environment and the sensor nodes in CPNS lacking tamper-resistance hardware increases the chance of being compromised by adversaries [7] . For example, the adversary can use the wireless devices to connect to the CPNS and compromise or physically capture sensor nodes through code injection attacks [8] or node replication attacks [9] , in which a number of compromised nodes can be controlled by the adversary throughout the sensor network and CPNS. The adversary can inject false measurement reports into the controller through compromised nodes [10] . This causes the controller to estimate wrong system states [11] and poses dangerous threats to the system [12] . The false reports consume many network and computation resources and shorten the lifetime of sensor networks and CPNS. Hence, to ensure the normal operation of the system, it is critical to filter false data at forwarding nodes before arriving at the controller.
In the past, a number of schemes have been designed to filter the false injected data in sensor networks [13] - [25] . However, those schemes have their limitations and cannot be used to effectively deal with attacks related to CPNS. For example, SEF [13] and IHA [17] have the -threshold limitation, that is, if the adversary compromises nodes from different groups, they can launch the node impersonating attack on legitimate nodes. LBRS [14] , LEDS [16] and CCEF [18] are vulnerable to node failure and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Those attacks may cause the controller not to receive measurement on time and make the system operation unstable. DEFS [19] and GRSEF [15] achieve low resilience to the number of compromised nodes and DEFS introduces lots of extra control messages and incurs the consumption of energy resources on nodes.
In this paper, we propose a Polynomial-based CompromiseResilient En-route Filtering scheme (PCREF) for CPNS, which can filter false injected data effectively and achieve a high resilience to the number of compromised nodes without relying on static data dissemination routes and node localization. PCREF adopts polynomials instead of MACs (Message Authentication Codes) to verify reports, and can mitigate node impersonating attacks against legitimate nodes. In our scheme, two types of nodes are considered: sensing node and forwarding node. The sensing node can not only sense and endorse the measurement reports of the monitored components, but also forward the measurement reports along the route, whereas the forwarding node is used to forward the received measurement reports to the controller. Each node stores two types of polynomials: authentication polynomial and check polynomial, which are derived by different primitive polynomials. Each sensing node stores the authentication polynomial of local cluster and the check polynomial of other clusters with a pre-defined probability. Each forwarding node stores the check polynomial of each cluster with the same probability. Instead of using the node association to share the authentication information between source nodes and forwarding nodes, our scheme uses the statistical pre-assignment to share the authentication information between nodes with a pre-defined probability that makes our scheme independent from static routes. In addition, PCREF assigns the authentication polynomial and check polynomial for each node based on the cluster-based polynomial assignment, i.e., nodes in different clusters are assigned different primitive polynomials and generate different authentication polynomial and check polynomial. In this way, the compromised nodes in one cluster will not affect the security of nodes in other clusters, i.e., suppressing the effect of compromised nodes within the local area. Hence, PCREF achieves high resilience on the increased number of compromised nodes.
Through the combination of both extensive theoretical analysis and experiments, we evaluate the effectiveness of PCREF in comparison with SEF [13] , LBRS [14] , GRSEF [15] and LEDS [15] in terms of filtering efficiency, filtering capability, and resilience to the number of compromised nodes. Our data shows that PCREF achieves better performance than existing schemes. For example, the filtering efficiency of PCREF increases as the forwarded hops increase, and it is always greater than that of existing schemes. In terms of filtering capability, given a network with 10000 nodes, PCREF can filter false data within seven forwarded hops even if 20 percent of sensor nodes are compromised, while other schemes can lose the en-route filtering capability completely. The average number of forwarded hops of PCREF increases slowly, as the size of network increases. With the same number of compromised nodes, the compromised area ratio of PCREF is the lowest in comparison with the existing schemes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We introduce the basis of en-route filtering, the network and threat models in Section 2. We present our proposed scheme in Section 3. We analyze the security properties of our scheme in Section 4, and its overhead in Section 5, respectively. We discuss the tradeoffs between security and overhead of our scheme in Section 6. In Section 7, we show both analytical and experimental results to validate our theory and findings. We review related work in Section 8 and conclude this paper in Section 9.
BACKGROUND

The Basis of En-Route Filtering
Generally speaking, en-route filtering is a scheme by which intermediate nodes confirm the authenticity of messages and filter them when those messages travel through the network. Most of the existing en-route filtering schemes are based on authentication, i.e., a legitimate measurement report must carry at least valid message authentication codes (MACs) generated by different valid sensor nodes in CPNS, where is the threshold and predefined before CPNS is deployed. When a report is transmitted from a sensor node to the controller, each forwarding node checks whether the forwarding reports actually carry valid MACs. If not, the report is considered a false one forged by the adversary and then dropped. Otherwise, the report is forwarded to the next forwarding nodes along the route.
Network and Threat Models
There are two types of nodes in the system: sensing nodes and forwarding nodes, shown as green nodes and red nodes in Fig. 1 . These two types of nodes are denoted as sensor nodes in the paper. Note that the two nodes in Fig. 1 connected with bidirectional link means that these two nodes are within each other's wireless communication range and can communicate with each other directly. The sensing nodes can not only sense and form the measurement reports of the monitored components, but also forward the measurement reports of other nodes. The forwarding nodes can only forward the measurement reports to the controller. We assume that each cluster has a unique cluster ID and each node has a unique node ID. Sensor nodes that measure or forward measurement reports have a limited computation and communication capability and limited energy resources. Sensor nodes lack tamper-resistance hardware and can be compromised by the adversary.
We assume that the adversary can compromise sensor nodes, including both sensing nodes and forwarding nodes. Once a node is compromised, the secret information stored in the node becomes visible to the adversary. The adversary can inject false measurement reports to the controller through compromised nodes. This causes the controller to estimate wrong system states and sends wrong control commands to actuators, posing dangerous threat to the system. The false reports also consume network and computation resources and shorten the lifetime of CPNS. We assume that the controller is well protected and the adversary can only obtain the authentication information through compromising sensor nodes. We also assume that there is a reliable node initialization after nodes have been deployed, and the adversary will not compromise or damage any node during the initialization phase.
OUR APPROACH
We now describe the basic idea of our scheme. PCREF uses polynomials instead of MACs to verify reports, and can mitigate the node impersonating attack against legitimate nodes. By organizing a set of sensing nodes into a cluster, where nodes are responsible for the same monitored components, PCREF assigns the corresponding authentication polynomial and check polynomials to each sensor node. These polynomials stored in nodes are bundled with node ID and derived by the primitive polynomials assigned from a primitive polynomial pool. Different primitive polynomials will be used in different clusters through the cluster-based primitive polynomial assignment. In the cluster-based primitive polynomial assignment, nodes in different clusters are assigned different primitive polynomials from the global primitive polynomial pool and generate different authentication polynomial and check polynomial. Based on this assignment, even if adversaries compromise nodes in one cluster, they will not affect the security of nodes in other clusters. The authentication polynomial stored in each node is used to endorse the report of local component measurement while the check polynomial is used to validate the received reports. Each sensing node stores the authentication polynomial of the local cluster and stores the check polynomial of other clusters with a pre-defined probability . Each forwarding node stores the check polynomial of each cluster with the same probability . Note that, probability is introduced to measure the acceptable probability of sharing authentication information between two nodes in CPNS and can affect the authenticity of PCREF, the detailed analysis can be found shown in Section 4. Our scheme also uses -authentication framework similar to [13] - [17] , i.e., a legitimate report shall be authenticated by nodes from the same cluster.
Our scheme consists of the following two key components: (i) authentication information management is used to assign the key, authentication polynomial, check polynomial, and local ID of sensing nodes, and (ii) data security management is used to detect and filter the false measurement reports. These two components will be described in the next two subsections. The notations used in this paper are shown in Table 1 .
Authentication Information Management
Before the sensor nodes are deployed, we need to prepare a master key and a global primitive polynomial pool. The master key can be generated and stored in the memory of nodes before nodes are deployed and used to produce the cluster key for each cluster. The global primitive polynomial pool consists of several ternary polynomials, which are randomly created before nodes are deployed. The global primitive polynomial pool is used to assign the primitive polynomial to each cluster and its size is < , where is the number of sensing nodes monitoring a component, is the total sensing nodes in the system. Finally, there is a hash function in our scheme, and its domain and range are the set of encrypted measurements of components reported by sensing nodes and the set of positive integers, respectively.
Step 1: Cluster organization. In our scheme, each monitored component is monitored by sensing nodes organized as a cluster. We can deploy sensing nodes close to the monitored component. Those nodes communicate with each other and each node only stores the node IDs of other sensing nodes in its cluster regardless of the number of hops a node and its neighboring nodes in the cluster. Note that the node does not store the node ID of neighbors outside its cluster even if the neighbors are only one-hop away. The node ID is stored in the node before being deployed.
Step 2: Authentication information assignment. In this stage, the network designer initializes all nodes and the network with the following parameters:
, where is the master key, is the element from a set of primitive polynomials, is the threshold, and is the hash function, and are unknown parameters of the ternary polynomial. The sets of represent all sensing node IDs, all forwarding nodes IDs, and all measurement reports of monitored components, respectively. For each sensing node , the designer stores the master key and the hash function in . He also reads the cluster ID stored in the node, and computes the authentication polynomial of cluster for by where are parameters, is the sensing node ID in cluster is the primitive polynomial of cluster is the authentication polynomial of cluster for , and . Note that the system designer randomly chooses the value of while computing the authentication polynomial. Thus, no other party knows the value of except the system designer, thereby no other party can extrapolate the authentication polynomial of the cluster . Note that the purpose of using is to increase the resilience of our scheme to the number of compromised nodes, which is analyzed in detail in Section 4. After the computation, the is stored in node . The designer then computes the check polynomials for node . For each cluster , the designer computes the check polynomial with a probability , and stores these check polynomials in node by where is the check polynomial of cluster stored in node and it plays the same role as . In fact, and can be any value of , where is a positive integer. In our scheme, setting and as is to allow the en-routing filtering to be more efficient, which are stated in the next subsection. In addition, when and are larger values in the set , the memory storage cost will increase rapidly because sensor nodes need more memory to store the authentication information based on Equations (1) and (2) . In addition, the set of four values for and can ensure the resilience of our scheme, which is analyzed in Section 4. Hence, to balance the storage cost of nodes and resilience of our scheme and make a reasonable memory storage for sensor node, we set the range of as . For each forwarding node , the designer computes the check polynomials of all the clusters with probability and stores hash function , and the check polynomials in node .
Note that in this stage, we use the cluster-based primitive polynomial assignment mechanism to ensure that the primitive polynomial assigned for one cluster is different from others. The use of the ID-based polynomial generation ensures that the authentication polynomial and the check polynomial stored in one node are different from other nodes. Our scheme leads to a high resilience to node impersonation attacks because the authentication information of one cluster has no impact on another cluster. The formation of authentication information in our scheme does not require node localization, which is required by [14] - [16] and [18] .
Step 3: Key generation. In this stage, by using the master key , each sensing node generates the cluster key. Using Fig. 1 as an example, the cluster key of cluster stored in is where is the cluster head ID and is denoted as the concatenation operation and its function is to combine two strings to one string, is the cluster key generation function. Equation 3 shows the concatenation of string and to one new string, and then uses the new string to generate the cluster key . Note that is erased once the network deployment is completed. With the assumption that the adversary cannot compromise the node during the initialization phase, the adversary does not know even if the adversary compromises nodes in the filtering phase. In addition, because is generated by , the adversary cannot obtain from the unknown . Hence, and are not globally known, and thus nodes outside the cluster cannot decrypt the measurement from the report. We assume that, because the controller is well protected and the adversary cannot compromise it, and thus the cluster IDs of all clusters, the masker keys of all clusters, the cluster key generation function can be stored in the controller without losing confidentiality. Hence, the controller can obtain the cluster keys of all clusters.
Step 4: Local ID assignment. In this stage, each sensing node is assigned a local ID by its cluster-head. Cluster-head sends the local ID assignment message to every nodes in its cluster:
, where is denoted as the connection operation, is the local ID of assigned by . After receiving the message, node stores the local ID and sends the following response message . The cluster-head collects all response messages and determines whether local IDs are assigned to the different cluster nodes. Note that is the number of sensing nodes monitoring the physical component. Because of the unreliable wireless communication, the cluster-head may not receive the response messages from the same cluster nodes. If this occurs, the cluster-head considers that these local IDs have not been assigned to cluster nodes. If the cluster-head finds that a local ID has not been assigned, it repeats the above process and assigns the local ID to a node. This process is only used to ensure that each cluster node is assigned one local ID. By using the local ID assignment, the cluster-head assigns the local ID to all nodes in the cluster and ensures that for any , there is a stored in one and only one cluster node. By screening the local ID attached in the sensing report of monitored components, our scheme can detect the false measurement reports sent by the compromised cluster-header and increase the resilience to false data injection attacks. The detailed detection process is stated in Step 2 of the data security management in Section 3.2.
Overall, the node initialization of PCREF consists of four steps. In particular, Step 1 is conducted during the predeployment by the network designer.
Step 2 is conducted by the network designer after the CPNS is deployed.
Step 3 and
Step 4 are carried out after the CPNS is deployed and do not need any input from the network designer. After completing the four steps described above, the authentication information assignment is complete and the corresponding authentication information is stored in all sensor nodes. The authentication information plays a critical role in the data security management to detect and filter the false measurement reports, which will be discussed next.
Data Security Management
Step 1: Sensing report generation. Each sensing node measures the data of the monitored component and generates the sensing report , which consists of the encrypted measurement, node ID, local ID, and MAP. Sensing nodes generate different MAPs for the same measurement using their node ID and locally stored authentication polynomial. For example, node first computes the report by applying the hash function to the encrypted measurement, which has been encrypted by the key , represented by Equation (4).
where is the measurements of its monitored component, is the hash function stored in node and is the cluster key for the cluster, to which belongs. Then node generates MAP for the measurement by where is the authentication polynomial stored in node . As we can see, the MAP is a polynomial, which has only one parameter and is bundled with node ID. After combining with the check polynomial stored in the intermediate nodes along the route, MAP can be used to detect the correctness of forwarded measurement reports. To reduce the communication overhead of forwarding the measurement reports, PCREF only adds the coefficients of each MAP into report.
After generating the sensing report , every sensing node sends the report to the cluster-head . The report is constructed by , where is denoted as the concatenation operator, is node ID, is local ID of and MAP is the authentication information of measurements generated by node and can be derived from Equation (5). The measurements is encrypted through the cluster key , and thus any node outside the cluster cannot decrypt from the report.
Step 2: Measurement report generation and transmission. After receiving all sensing reports generated by the sensing nodes, the cluster-head randomly chooses reports from them and merges these measurement reports to an integrated measurement report and sends it to the controller. The measurement report is formed by, where is the cluster ID, is denoted as MAP generated by node , is the timestamp, and other notations are the same as ones in .
After generating , the cluster-head sends it to the controller through the intermediate nodes along the route. Because of the broadcast nature of wireless communication, the sensing nodes in the same cluster also eavesdrop the measurement report sent by cluster-head and determine: (i) local IDs included in satisfies and , where is the number of sensing nodes for monitoring the component. (ii) The information attached in is the same as that stored in each sensing node with local ID . If the above two conditions are not satisfied, sensing nodes will send the warning message to the first intermediate node and request it to drop report . Otherwise, no warning message will be sent and this means that is the true integrated measurement reports of the monitored component. Note that, in our scheme, only the first intermediate node that receives the report from the cluster-header needs to receive the warning message to detect whether the local ID attached in the report is legitimate. Hence, to ensure the warning message reaches the first intermediate node before it forwards the report to the next intermediate node, our scheme assumes that the first intermediate node should wait a few clock cycles for receiving the warning messages after receiving measurement reports. When the first intermediate node receives the measurement report, it waits for several clock cycles for receiving the warning message. If clock cycles are complete and no warning message arrives, the first intermediate node detects and forwards the measurement report. The number of clock cycles can be predefined and the waiting time ensures that the sensing nodes can complete the decision and send out the warning message. In this way, PCREF can drop the false measurement report forged by the compromised cluster-header effectively at the first intermediate node along the forwarding route.
Note that in our scheme, we do not focus on any specific communication schemes or routing protocols and the sensors need not always be on. The forwarding nodes can leverage the existing duty-cycle schemes to switch on/off and save energy. The communication scheme and routing protocols developed in the past can be leveraged to establish routes to forward the measurement reports through forwarding nodes. The energy consumption and the lifetime of sensor nodes will be analyzed in Section 5.
The cluster-head and ordinary sensing node can also serve as the forwarding nodes. If the adversary compromises the ordinary sensing node or cluster-header, he can forge and send the false measurement reports of other components to the controller via the compromised nodes. Then the above approach cannot detect and filter this false report. To deal with this issue, PCREF adopts the en-route filtering mechanism described in the next step.
Step 3: En-route filtering. By leveraging the polynomialbased message authentication introduced in [26] , PCREF conducts the en-route filtering on false measurement reported from the compromised nodes while the existing approaches [26] cannot do so. In PCREF, the measurement report is transmitted to the controller hop-by-hop. The intermediate node, which does not have the corresponding check polynomial associated with the cluster, where the measurement is originally generated (e.g., cluster ID is attached in the report), forwards the measurement report to the next node along the route. The intermediate node, which has the corresponding check polynomial, determines whether the received measurement report is false through validating the following conditions: (i) Condition 1: The as timestamp attached in is fresh. (ii) Condition 2: MAPs attached in the report are different and are generated by the sensing nodes in the corresponding cluster, where cluster ID is claimed in the report. (iii) Condition 3:
MAPs can be verified by the corresponding check polynomial stored in the intermediate node.
If the above three conditions are not satisfied, the intermediate node will drop the measurement report. Otherwise, the measurement report will be forwarded. The timestamp denoted as field in the message can specify the time when the measurement reports are generated in the monitored component. The forwarding nodes and controller can determine whether the received reports is the newest generated one, i.e., whether it is fresh. Hence, the Condition 1 uses the as timestamp to determine the freshness of the forwarded measurement reports and detect the replayed false report. To verify the Condition 2 and Condition 3, the intermediate node first calculates the values of and with the value of calculated by Equation (4), where is the node ID of the intermediate node,
is the sensing node ID carried in the report, is the MAP generated by and is included in the report, is the check polynomial of cluster stored at node . As we can see from Equations (7) and (8),
, and only if belongs to { }, the MAP generated by node can be determined as valid one. The reason is that belongs to , and belongs to . Note that, this approach could lead to the negative rate with for the forwarded false measurement report, where is the number of median coefficients of each MAP. However, according to the security analysis of PCREF described in Section 4, the successful rate of forging MAPs is very small and can be generally ignored, when no knowledge of authentication information is revealed to the adversary.
The intermediate node verifies all MAPs in the report via the same check polynomial, which ensures that MAPs are derived by the same primitive polynomial. Through the cluster-based primitive polynomial assignment, PCREF ensures that only the sensing nodes in the same cluster have the same primitive polynomial. By using the same check polynomial, the Condition 2 can be satisfied. Meanwhile, the Condition 3 can be satisfied only if all MAPs carried in the report are valid. If all three conditions are satisfied, the intermediate node forwards the measurement report. Otherwise, the measurement report will be filtered.
Step 4: Controller authentication. After receiving the measurement report, the controller validates it in the same way as the intermediate node. Because the controller stores all primitive polynomials and all cluster keys and master keys of all cluster, it can validate all received measurement reports and filter the false measurement reports, which bypass the detection of intermediate nodes. If the report is confirmed as legitimate, the controller decrypts the measurements from the report, and estimates the state of monitored component and sends the commands to the actuators to control the operation of physical systems. Because it contains the complete authentication information, the controller is the last defense in the system and can detect and filter all the false measurement reports forged by the adversary.
Example
To describe PCREF clearly, we use the following example to explain how PCREF works. As see in Fig. 1 , and are sensing nodes used to monitor the component , and is the cluster-header. With the assumption that is 3 and the measurement report of component is transmitted to the controller through forwarding nodes and only and have the check polynomial of cluster , which are assigned during the step 2 of the authentication management
. By the use of , the controller estimates the component state and sends feedback control commands to the actuators.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Confidentiality
In PCREF, measurements are encrypted by the cluster key, and the measurement report is forwarded through reliable hop-by-hop communication, and thus, except for nodes in the cluster, other nodes cannot determine the measurements of the component. Only if the adversary compromises at least one node in the cluster and obtains the cluster key, he can compromise the measurements of the component. PCREF considers the random node capture attack, and sensing nodes are randomly compromised by the adversary. Note that we only consider sensing nodes because compromising forwarding nodes does not help for obtaining the cluster key. We assume that there are sensing nodes and forwarding nodes in the system, and each cluster has sensing nodes. Then the probability that the adversary obtains the cluster key of a cluster is , i.e. at least one node of the cluster is compromised by the adversary, Fig. 2 shows the confidentiality-losing probability of a cluster versus the number of compromised nodes. As we can see, PCREF can maintain a high confidentiality of measurement of a component with the increased number of compromised nodes. In addition, as the number of sensing nodes in a cluster decreases, the confidentiality resilience of PCREF to the number of compromised nodes decreases. The reason is that, as the number of sensing nodes in the cluster decrease, the number of whole sensor nodes decreases while the number of components is constant. Hence, with the same number of compromised nodes, a higher probability of a cluster with at least one node being compromised (i.e., the probability of a component's measurements being known to the adversary) is achieved. However, decreasing the number of sensing nodes in a cluster could reduce the deployment cost with less sensors. Hence, the choice of the number of sensing nodes in a cluster should balance the confidentiality of measurements and deployment cost.
Authenticity
The performance metrics are listed as follows: (i) MAP forging successful rate is defined as the probability of a MAP of measurement to be successfully forged by the adversary, who does not have the knowledge of authentication information.
(ii) Filtering efficiency is defined as the probability of false data to be filtered out within a number of hops. (iii) Attack resilience is defined as the ratio of compromised components (clusters) versus the total components (clusters) in the system. (iv) Filteringcapability is defined as the average forwarded hops of false measurement reports, i.e., the average number of hops that the false measurement report will be forwarded before being detected and filtered.
MAP Forging Successful Rate: In PCREF, the MAP carried in the measurement report is a polynomial with one parameter and is defined as , where is the highest power of , and is the corresponding coefficient. Based on the en-routing filtering step of our approach stated in Section 3.2, a measurement report is considered as a valid one only if belongs to , where is equal to the calculated through Equation (5). Hence, in order to make the forged as valid one, the forged should make belongs to . Based on the above analysis and Equation (5) where is the number of MAPs carried in a measurement report, < is the number of legitimate MAPs that the adversary can derive through the authentication polynomials of compromised nodes. The size of is related to the primitive polynomial, and it usually has , and the maximal value of is . We can obtain from the previous Equation (10), which is very small and can be ignored. Hence, in the analysis above, we only consider that the forged MAP will be detected by the intermediate node, which has the corresponding check polynomial.
Filtering Efficiency: PCREF requires that valid MAPs be attached in each legitimate measurement report. When the adversary compromises < sensing nodes in the cluster and obtains authentication polynomials to derive valid MAPs, he has to attach the other forged MAPs in the forged report in order to successfully send the forged measurement to the controller.
In PCREF, each intermediate node stores the check polynomial for a cluster with the predefined probability . After receiving the measurement report, the intermediate node verifies all MAPs carried in the report to detect and filter out the false measurement reports. Hence, when < , the probability of a false measurement report filtered by the intermediate node is
, where is the number of compromised nodes in the cluster. Let the probability of a false measurement report filtered after being forwarded hops be and the probability of a false measurement report filtered within be . We have and . The filtering efficiency of PCREF can be represented by , which is defined as the probability of false measurement report to be filtered within a number of hops. The greater the probability, the better the filtering efficiency becomes. Numerical results in Fig. 3 show the filtering efficiency versus the forwarded hops when . As we can see, PCREF can filter most of the false measurement reports during the routing path, and thus it can detect and filter false measurement reports effectively. The higher the value of , the smaller the number of forwarded hops is required to filter the false measurement reports. This is because the probability of the check polynomial stored at the intermediate node increases as increases. However, each intermediate node stores check polynomials, and a smaller can reduce the storage overhead of the intermediate node.
Resilience to Attack: Because of the derivation from different primitive polynomials bundled with node ID, the authentication polynomial in the compromised nodes cannot be used to launch the node impersonating attack against the legitimate node. According to the filtering rules of PCREF, the measurement report is false if more than one MAP carried in the report is not derived from the primitive polynomial assigned to the cluster, where the report generates. Hence, to forge a "legitimate" false measurement report, the adversary shall compromise several sensing nodes and obtain or more authentication polynomials of the attached cluster. In PCREF, to obtain authentication polynomial of the target cluster, the adversary shall consider the two cases listed below: (i) Case 1: Use the check polynomial and authentication polynomial stored in compromised sensing nodes and forwarding nodes to derive the primitive polynomial of the target cluster and derive enough valid authentication polynomials via the derived primitive polynomial. (ii) Case 2: Compromise more than sensing nodes in the target cluster and obtain authentication polynomials stored in them.
The resilience of PCREF in Case 1. In PCREF, the adversary can derive the desired authentication polynomials if he obtains the primitive polynomial assigned to the targeted cluster. Nevertheless, in PCREF, because no one knows the primitive polynomials except the controller, the adversary can not obtain the primitive polynomial of the target cluster directly. We now analyze the possibility that the adversary derives the primitive polynomial of the target cluster through the authentication polynomials and check polynomials stored at the compromised nodes.
We assume that the targeted cluster is cluster , its primitive polynomial is , and the highest power of parameters are , respectively. Hence, can be represent by, , where is the coefficient and the number is . Hence, the authentication polynomial of cluster stored in the sensing node and the check polynomial of cluster stored in intermediate node can be represented by where is the sensing node in cluster and is the intermediate node outside cluster and are coefficients and can be fixed if the adversary compromises node and . For any value of , the adversary derives the above equations by .
Equation (13) is derived by the authentication polynomial and with ( ) unknown parameters in it (i.e., parameters for the coefficients of in and one parameter ), while Equation (14) is derived by the check polynomial and with unknown parameters in it (i.e., parameters for the coefficients of in and one parameter ). Only if or unknown parameters in Equations (13) or (14) are obtained,can the adversary derive the primitive polynomial of the target cluster. As we can see, because Equation (13) has different unknown parameters from Equation (14), they cannot be combined to derive the primitive polynomial. If the adversary compromises nodes and obtains authentication polynomials and check polynomials of the cluster to be attacked, he can generate Equation (13) and Equation (14) . However, from the adversary's perspective, Equation (13) have unknown coefficients of in and unknown s as different authentication polynomial has different . Hence, these equations have ( ) unknown parameters, and the number of unknown parameters increases as the number of equations increases and it always has < . According to the basic principle of calculus, we know that the adversary cannot derive all unknown parameters in Equation (13) and then obtain the desired primitive polynomial. Similarly, the adversary cannot derive the desired primitive polynomial from Equation (14) as well.
According to the analysis above, it is difficult for the adversary to derive the desired primitive polynomial from the obtained authentication polynomials and check polynomials. Hence, the adversary can successfully forge the false measurement reports of the targeted component only if he compromises sensing nodes in the attacked cluster.
The resilience of PCREF in Case 2. When sensing nodes are compromised by the adversary, the probability of a cluster with compromised sensing nodes becomes where is the total number of sensing nodes, and is the number of sensing nodes monitoring a given component in the cluster. The probability of a cluster having or more compromised sensing nodes, namely the compromised cluster, can be represented by Note that is also defined as the compromised clusters (i.e., compromised components) ratio over the network, that is, the ratio of monitored components where the corresponding measurement reports authenticity will be manipulated by the adversary by compromising sensing nodes. If the compromised area ratio increases slowly as the number of compromised nodes increases, we can determine that the filtering scheme has good resilience to the increased number of compromised nodes. Fig. 4 shows the ratio of compromised clusters versus the number of compromised sensing nodes, where there are 10000 nodes in the system. As we can see, the larger threshold , the lower the rate of compromised cluster is. When is 5, the ratio of compromised cluster approaches to a low value even though a large number of sensing nodes are compromised. Hence, PCREF achieves a high resilience to the increased number of compromised nodes.
Note that our approach achieves a higher resilience to attacks against the perturbation-polynomials-based schemes discussed in [27] . First, we divide the nodes into clusters, and different clusters are assigned different primitive polynomials. A node stores multiple bivariate polynomials derived from different primitive polynomials. To derive a target cluster's primitive polynomial, the adversary has to compromise enough number of nodes, which store bivariate polynomial derived from target cluster's primitive polynomial. Because nodes store target cluster's bivariate polynomial with a low probability, the adversary needs to compromise a large number of nodes with random capture attacks. Second, even if the adversary compromises enough nodes, it is difficult to derive targeted cluster's primitive polynomial. We introduce the two parameters and (unknown to the adversary) to increase resilience. Even if the adversary knows and 's ranges, the computation overhead of ciphering them is high and increases as the size of and and polynomial degree (e.g., if and are , and bivariate polynomial is a degree-3 polynomial, computation overhead is ). Third, even if the adversary can derive target cluster's primitive polynomials, the effect can be limited within the cluster's area without affecting other cluster areas.
Filtering Capacity
Recall that to measure the filtering capability, we define the average forwarded hops before the false measurement report being filtered as and we have where is the probability where given a number of compromised nodes in the system, the false measurement report is filtered after being forwarded at least hops. A smaller average forwarded hops leads to the greater filtering capacity. We assume that the maximum forwarded hops from sensors to the controller is , and the forged measurement reports can be forwarded hops and arrives at the controller if the cluster, where the measurement report is generated, has more than compromised sensing nodes. When < sensing nodes are compromised in the attacked cluster, the adversary should forge MAPs in each forged measurement report. If the adversary compromises the intermediate nodes, these forged reports can escape the filtering and be forwarded to the controller. Hence, only if the desired cluster has less than compromised sensing nodes and at least one intermediate node (which has the check polynomial of desired cluster) is in its routing path and is not compromised, the forged measurement report from the targeted cluster will be filtered. Based on the conditions discussed above, we analyze the filtering capacity of PCREF in terms of the number of compromised sensing nodes.
When the adversary compromises sensor nodes, including sensing nodes and forwarding nodes, the probability of cluster with less than compromised sensing nodes is , and the probability that an intermediate node filters the false measurement report is . We assume that the probabilities of a node being the sensing node or the forwarding node is 0.5 and we have , where is the probability of intermediate node with corresponding check polynomial, is the number of sensing nodes, and is the number of forwarding nodes. Hence, the probability that the false measurement report is filtered after forwarding hops is denoted as and we have , where
. Recall that there are the following two ways for the adversary to successfully inject the false measurement reports to the controller: (i) compromising or more sensing nodes within the cluster, and (ii) compromising less than sensing nodes within the cluster and compromising all intermediate nodes storing the check polynomial of the target cluster. Hence, the probability that the false measurement reports are forwarded hops becomes
. As we can see from the numerical data shown in Fig. 5 , even though a large number of nodes is compromised, PCREF can still filter them within a few forwarded hops.
OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
Storage Overhead
In PCREF, each sensing node stores the authentication polynomial of the cluster that it belongs to and check polynomials of other clusters, and each forwarding node stores check polynomials, where is the number of components. Hence, each node stores at most ( ) polynomials derived by the primitive polynomial and two unknown parameters in each of the polynomial. In our scheme, each node only stores the coefficients of the polynomial. According to Equation (11) and Equation (12), each node only stores and coefficients. Let is be the number of coefficients stored in each node and we have . Each sensing node stores one cluster key shared with its cluster-head and multiple keys shared with its one-hop neighbors, while each forwarding node stores multiple keys shared with its one-hop neighbors. To simplify our analysis, we assume that all monitored components are uniformly distributed in the physical system, and all nodes are uniformly deployed. The deployment area of sensors, the communication radius of the sensor node, and the max number of keys stored in a node are denoted as and , respectively. We have , where represents the number of forwarding nodes in the system. Note that the coefficient and key can be represented by and , respectively. The total storage overhead of PCREF becomes For example, in the system in area with 100 monitored components, each component is monitored by 10 sensing nodes with a communication radius of , and the number of forwarding nodes is equal to the number of sensing nodes. The sharing rate of the check polynomial, say , is 0.2, the highest power of unknown parameters of the primitive polynomial, say , , , are 2, which are the typical values of these parameters. In this scenario, according to Equation (18), the storage overhead of each node in PCREF is , i.e., . This means that only less than memory is required for each sensing node to store the authentication information. Even in a large network, the storage overhead for PCREF can be easily managed by common sensing nodes.
Computation and Communication Overhead
In PCREF, as the generation of the authentication and check polynomial will be completed by the system designer or operator, it would not increase the computation overhead of PCREF. Hence, the computation overhead of our scheme only includes the computation overhead of keys during initialization phase, the computation overhead of computing MAPs with the highest power of and the values of check polynomials with the highest power of , and one encryption and decryption operation during the en-route filtering. Because the values of , and are small (commonly all are 2), the computation overhead of PCREF is acceptable to the resource-limited sensor nodes.
The extra communication overhead of PCREF comes from receiving and forwarding MAPs attached in the measurement report. Each MAP is a polynomial with one unknown parameter, whose highest power is , and can be represented by . When the number of MAPs carried in a report is 5, the extra communication overhead is only . However, the extra communication overhead provides enough resilience and security for the measurement report transmission. In addition, the value of should be defined through balancing the extra communication overhead, sensing node redundancy, and security. The reason is that larger increases the security, incurs the extra communication overhead of PCREF, and requires more redundant sensing nodes. In comparison with LEDS and LBRS, PCREF incurs less extra communication overhead because it does not require node localization and node association.
Energy Cost Overhead
The false measurement reports injected by the adversary not only lead to the wrong system state estimation [11] , [12] , [28] , but also consume extra energy of nodes because of forwarding the false measurement reports. Hence, the false data filtering scheme should achieve the objective of energy saving. In the following, we analyze the energy cost of PCREF using the same model as SEF [13] .
Let and be the lengths of original reports, cluster ID, node ID, local ID, MAP, and timestamp, respectively. The length of a measurement report is denoted as , where and represent the average forwarded hops from the source cluster to the controller and the energy consumption of sensor node that receives and forwards , respectively, and the ratio of legitimate reports and false reports is . Without our scheme, all reports are forwarded hops. In our scheme, only the legitimate reports are forwarded hops and false reports are forwarded hops uniformly. Let and be the communication energy consumption with and without our scheme, respectively. We have and , where represents the average forwarded hops of the false measurement reports derived from Equation (17) . In sensor nodes, because the energy consumption for computation is much smaller than the energy consumption for communication, we only consider the energy consumption for communication.
From Fig. 6 , we can see that our scheme can reduce the energy consumption in comparison with the case where our scheme is not used. As the number of compromised nodes increases, grows linearly while is always smaller than . The reason is that, with the increased number of compromised nodes, PCREF can always filter them out in a few forwarded hops and the communication overhead and energy consumption can be largely reduced. Fig. 7 shows the energy consumption in terms of our schemes and the existing schemes. We can see that the existing schemes can save more energy when the number of compromised nodes is small. As the number of compromised nodes increases, the energy consumption of existing schemes increase rapidly, and the energy consumption of our scheme increase slowly and is lower than that of existing schemes.
DISCUSSION
In PCREF, the intermediate node storing the corresponding check polynomial verifies all MAPs carried in a measurement report, i.e., only one intermediate node with the corresponding check polynomial can filter out the forged measurement report. Hence, as long as one or two intermediate nodes with the corresponding check polynomial are included in the routing path, the forged measurement report can be filtered. Note that, usually only one appropriate intermediate node with the corresponding check polynomial included in the routing path is enough, but two or more appropriate nodes with the corresponding check polynomial included in the routing path can increase the resilience to the nodes in the routing path being compromised. Because of this, the appropriate should be chosen in the following range,
, where is the max number of intermediate nodes with the corresponding check polynomial included in the routing path and is normally selected as 2, and is average forwarded hops. For , we have , where is the distance from the farthest component to the controller, and is the communication radius of sensor node. Note that, the above approach may make intermediate nodes in the routing path between a cluster and the controller not to have the check polynomials of the clusters, if the cluster is close to the controller. However, in this case, the measurement report generated in the cluster can be forwarded to the controller within a few hops and be filtered by the controller, and the less that extra energy of intermediate nodes will be consumed during this process. Hence, although this approach increases the communication overhead of some intermediate nodes, it reduces the storage overhead and computation overhead and ultimately reduces the resource consumption. Based on different applications and resources of sensor nodes, the user can choose the appropriate value of and for applications.
Because each forwarding node that has the check polynomial should compute the authentication polynomial and check polynomial times, based on Equations (7) and (8), the forwarding node would consume a lot of computation resources. To balance the computation resources and filtering efficiency, stochastic detection can be considered, in which the forwarding node will not compute all authentication polynomials and check polynomials, but randomly choose of them and compute these authentication polynomials and check polynomials, where is the predefined parameter and is less than , i.e., < . The extended approach can be denoted as -PCREF. In this way, the computation resource overhead on each forwarding node can be largely reduced. In this case, we assume that the adversary compromises some nodes and obtains authentication polynomials. If is less than , the forwarding node can always detect the forged authentication, and thus the filtering probability is still . If is more than , the forwarding node may choose legitimate authentication polynomials and cannot not detect the forged ones. When this happens, the false report will bypass the detection of the forwarding nodes and the filtering efficiency can be reduced. Fig. 8 shows the filtering efficiency of the forwarding node when it only randomly detects authentication polynomial in each report. As we can see, -PCREF (extended PCREF) can achieve the same filtering efficiency as PCREF, if the number of authentication polynomial that the adversary obtains is less than , i.e., < . If is larger than , i.e., > , -PCREF will achieve a lower filtering efficiency than PCREF. However, -PCREF can filter 80% false report within 20 forwarded hops. In addition, improving the sharing probability can also improve the filtering efficiency of -PCREF. That is, increasing the number of check polynomials stored in each forwarding node can make -PCREF achieve high filtering efficiency and low computation overhead while increasing the storage overhead. Hence, -PCREF can achieve great filtering efficiency and low computation overhead in CPNS that has good storage resources.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In our evaluation setting, we consider the scenario of 100 components and 1000 sensing nodes (i.e., each component is monitored by 10 sensing nodes). Cluster used in PCREF monitor components similar to how cells are used in LBRS and LEDS. We also set , , and the node communication radius , which are the typical values in [13] - [16] . For LBRS, the beam width is set to [14] . For SEF, GRSEF, LBRS and PCREF, the key sharing probability or the check polynomial sharing probability is 0.2. In each simulation, a number of sensing nodes are randomly selected as the compromised nodes. The filtering efficiency is evaluated by the ratio of filtered false measurement reports within forwarded hops. Filtering capability is evaluated by the average forwarded hops, in which the false measurement report is forwarded until being filtered. The resilience can be evaluated by the ratio of total compromised components versus the total number of components. Note that, for the MAP forging successful ratio mentioned in Section 4, we prove that the adversary can not forge a legitimate MAP with no knowledge of authentication information. Hence, we did not simulate this case in our simulation. All simulations in this paper were completed using Matlab 6.5.
Filtering Efficiency: Fig. 9 shows the analytical results of the ratio of filtered false measurement reports versus the number of forwarded hops of SEF, PCREF, LEDS, GRSEF and LBRS. Fig. 10 shows the simulation results of those schemes, when 10% of the total number of nodes are compromised by the adversary. As we can see, both the analytical and simulation results consistently show that PCREF achieves the highest ratio of filtered false measurement reports and SEF achieves the worst performance. The filtering efficiencies of GRSEF, LBRS, and LEDS are always smaller than that of PCREF.
Filtering Capability: Figs. 11 and 12 show the average hops that the measurement reports are forwarded versus the number of compromised sensing nodes in term of analysis and simulation, respectively. As we can see, when the number of compromised sensing nodes increases, the average forwarded hops of PCREF increases slowly while it increases rapidly for other schemes. When the number of compromised sensing nodes is less than 30 (i.e., 3% of the total number of nodes), the average forwarded hops of PCREF is one hop larger than that of LBRS and LEDS. The reason is that LBRS and LEDS rely on static routes and achieve higher filtering efficiency within first several forwarded hops. However, using specific routes makes LEDS and LBRS vulnerable, because once the adversary disrupts the route (e.g., jamming), the measurement report cannot be transmitted to the controller on time and the system performance is significantly degraded.
Resilience: The resilience to attack is measured by the ratio of compromised clusters (or cells). The compromised cluster (or cell) refers to the one where more than sensing nodes are compromised and the forged measurement reports from that cluster will not be detected by intermediate nodes. and 14, we can see that because of -threshold limitation, the ratio of compromised components of SEF approaches to 100% when more than 10 nodes (i.e., 1% of the total number of nodes) are compromised, and the ratio of PCREF and LEDS are obvious less than these of LBRS and GRSEF. In Figs. 15 and  16 , when the number of compromised nodes is 500 (i.e., 50% of the total number of nodes), the ratio of compromised clusters for PCREF and LEDS approaches 60% and 80%, respectively and that of PCREF is always better than that of LEDS. As we can see, PCREF achieves the highest resilience to increased number of compromised sensing nodes without relying on static routes and node localization.
RELATED WORKS
To mitigate the false data injected by the adversary in sensor networks, a number of en-route filtering schemes have been developed [13] - [25] . For example SEF [13] and IHA [17] are the first two proposed schemes to conduct en-route filtering of false reports. Both SEF and IHA have the -threshold limitation. LBRS [14] and LEDS [16] avoid the -threshold limitation through cell-based report generation and location-ware key generation techniques by using node localization and node association based on statically configure routes or conforming to beam model [14] . All these limit their usage in CPNS.
There are other en-route filtering schemes [18] , [20] , [15] , [21] , [23] - [25] . For example, CCEF [18] introduced the commutative cipher instead of sharing the symmetric key to filter false data en-route. EAB [20] introduced authentication bitmap, instead of using MAC as the proof to verify the reports. It also relies on static data dissemination routes, which are vulnerable to attacks. Lin et al. investigated the efficiency of existing schemes [25] . As we can see, the existing schemes either have -threshold limitation, or rely on node localization, node association and statically configure routes, which limit their usage in CPNS for monitoring physical components and systems.
The polynomial-based technique has been used for applications [29] , [30] , [26] . For example, work in [29] and [30] proposed the perturbation number and perturbation polynomial-based techniques for compromise-resilient key management. Work in [26] proposed a perturbation polynomial-based technique to authenticate messages. Different from existing research, we develop a novel polynomial-based technique to conduct the en-route filtering against false data injection attacks.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a Polynomial-based CompromiseResilient En-route Filtering scheme (PCREF), which can filter false data en-route effectively and achieve high resilience to the number of compromised nodes without relying on static routes and node localization. PCREF adopts polynomials for endorsing measurement reports to improve resilience to node impersonating attacks. Each node stores two types of polynomials: authentication polynomial and check polynomial, derived from primitive polynomials, and used for endorsing and verifying the measurement reports, respectively. We developed a cluster-based primitive polynomial assignment to limit the effect of compromised nodes to a small area. Via both theoretical analysis and simulation experiments, our data shows that our developed scheme achieves better filtering capacity and resilience to a large number of compromised nodes in comparison with the existing schemes. recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agencies. where he served as senior associate vice president for research and professor of computer science. As an elected IEEE fellow, he has made significant contributions in distributed computing, real-time systems, computer networks, and cyber space security.
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